We consider a two player simultaneous-move game where the two players each select any permissible n-sided die for a fixed integer n. A player wins if the outcome of his roll is greater than that of his opponent. Remarkably, for n > 3, there is a unique Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies. The unique Nash Equilibrium is for each player to throw the Standard n-sided die, where each side has a different number. Our proof of uniqueness is constructive. We introduce an algorithm with which, for any nonstandard die, we may generate another die that beats it.
Introduction

If Hercules and Lychas play at dice
Which is the better man, the greater throw May turn by fortune from the weaker hand.
William Shakespeare,
The Merchant of Venice
Nontransitive dice are a fascinating topic in applied probability. They first came into the limelight as a result of a paper by Martin Gardner (Gardner (1970) ) [6] . They are one of a larger class of nontransitivity "paradoxes" (see [11] , [2] ), which also include the well-known Condorcet Voting Paradox, as described in [5] .
Recent papers published concerning nontransitive dice include [1] , [3] , and [10] . Another recent interpretation of the situation is by Hetyei (2016) [8] who instead characterizes the scenario as one modeled by throws of unfair coins. Finally, the issue of nontransitive dice is the subject of a polymath project proposal (at the time of this draft's writing) by Timothy Gowers [7] .
One problem that may be considered is how nontransitive dice should be played in a strategic interaction of two or more players. Rump (2001) [9] was the first to explore this: he looks at the two player game where each player could choose one of four specific 1 nontransitive symmetric dice and finds the set of equilibria. He then extends the situation to one where the players each choose two dice.
Our paper examines a broader problem: we consider a two-player, one-shot, simultaneous move game in which each player selects a general n-sided die and rolls it. The player with the highest face showing wins a reward, which we may normalize to 1. The solution concept that we use for the game is that of a Nash Equilibrium. We show that for n > 3 there is a single, unique Nash Equilibrium in which both players play the standard die. Moreover, our proof of uniqueness is constructive and we present an algorithm that, for any non-standard die, generates a die that beats it. One notable implication of this is that for any non-standard die, there is at least one die that is the result of a one-step, the most elementary step of our algorithm, applied to the standard die, that beats it. [4] consider the same problem, where for some fixed integer n, two players each choose a die and roll against each other. They also show the standard die ties any other die in expectation, and that every nonstandard die loses to some other die. They look at the optimal strategy in the game where the standard die has been removed.
Finkelstein and Thorp
Our paper differs from [4] in the following key ways. We provide different proofs of the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium in the game 2 , and we are able to do so using exclusively elementary mathematics. Additionally, our proof is constructive and we formulate a simple algorithm that allows us, for any non-standard die, to generate a die that beats it. Finally, the corollary that for any non standard die, there is a die that beats it that is merely a one-step away from the standard die is also novel.
This paper uses terminology from the potential Polymath project weblog post by Gowers ([7] ) and from Conrey et. all (2016) [3] .
The structure of this paper is follows: in Section 2 we introduce relevant terms, formulate the game, and present the main result of the paper, Theorem 1. In Sections 3 and 4 we prove Propositions 1 and 2, that (S n , S n ) is a Nash Equilibrium and that it is unique (for n ≥ 4), respectively.
The Basic Game
Define a general n-sided die (henceforth just "die") as an integer-valued random variable D n that takes values in the finite set 1, 2, ..., n , where the distribution must satisfy the following conditions:
1. For each possible value of D n , m, the probability that it occurs, p m , is a multiple of 1/n.
2.
For a given n, denote the set of all n-sided dice by D n .
Then, a standard n -sided die, S n , is simply a die where each value occurs with equal probability, 1/n. Naturally S n ∈ D n .
We can represent any n-sided die, D n ∈ D n , as a (discrete) uniformly distributed random-variable that takes values in the multiset of size n, with elements in 1, 2, ..., n and sum equal to 
The Game
Consider two players, Amy (A) and Bob (B). They play the following one shot game. Fix n, Amy and Bob each independently select any n-sided die, A n , B n ∈ D n and then roll them against each other. Their expected payoffs are the probability that the realization of their roll is higher than the realization of their opponents roll 3 .
Then, a Strategy for Amy, (and analogously for Bob), is simply a choice of die Then,
We now present the following theorem:
Theorem 1. For any n, the unique Nash Equilibrium of the two player game is where both players play the standard die S n . That is, the unique Nash Equilibrium is the strategy pair (S n , S n ).
We shall prove this theorem by proving two propositions:
is a Nash Equilibrium; and Proposition 2, that (S n , S n ) is the unique equilibrium (for n ≥ 4).
(S n , S n ) is a Nash Equilibrium
We prove the following proposition:
Define a One-step, Φ(·), as an operation on a die
where the integer 1 is added to an element d j and subtracted from an element
That is,
Evidently, Φ(D n ) satisfies the conditions in Equation 2 and so Φ(D n ) is a die. We may make the following remark: Before, proving Proposition 1, we prove the following lemma:
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction. Evidently, ∀i ∈ A, B ,
First we show that ∀i ∈ A, B ,
We know that
WLOG we may suppose d j is the (n − 1)th term and d i is the second term. Then,
We subtract equation 10 from equation 11, yielding:
By Remark 1, any die can be reached in a sequence of one-steps from the standard die, S n . Denote by G n the die reached as the image of a sequence of one-steps of arbitrary length r from the standard die S n . That is, let
for an arbitrary sequence of one-steps (Φ 1 , Φ 2 , ..., Φ r ). Naturally, (with some abuse of notation), we can write G n as the multiset,
We shall find it useful to define α k as
Suppose that
We apply the arbitrary one-step Φ to G n :
We subtract equation 17 from equation 18, yielding:
Trivially, (and by Lemma 1),
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that U i (S n , S n ) is not a Nash Equilibrium.
Then, at least one player has a strictly profitable deviation. WLOG we shall suppose that it is Amy. Then, Amy has a strategyÂ n such that
This implies that
However, this violates Lemma 1. We have established a contradiction and may conclude that (S n , S n ) is a Nash Equilibrium.
Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium
Proposition 2. The Nash Equilibrium, (S n , S n ), is unique for n ≥ 4.
Suppose that there is another Nash equilibrium, given by (A n , B n ). Then, by the definition of a Nash Equilibrium,
Consequently, to prove our result, it is sufficient to show that ∃D n ∈ D n such that,
Suppose that (A n , B n ) = (S n , S n ) is a Nash Equilibrium. WLOG B n = S n . Clearly, ∀i ∈ A, B ,
Likewise, ∀i ∈ A, B ,
Pausing to interject with a brief aside,
Aside 1. Consider a strategy pair (A n , B n ). We say that player i has a profitable deviation if and only if there is a die that beats her opponents die.
Writing the two n-sided dice A n , B n ∈ D n as multisets, a 2 , . . . , a n )
we say A n Beats B n if the number of pairs (a i , b j ) with a i > b j exceeds the number of pairs with a i < b j .
Thus, it is sufficient to show that there is a dieD n that beats B n . Our proof of this is constructive. In the following proposition (Proposition 3), we present an algorithm that allows us, for any die B n = S n to find a die,D n , that beats it. Let,
Recall,
Define γ k , k ∈ 1, 2, ..., n as the number of elements of B n equal to s k = k.
Define ξ k as
Then, we write the following table:
This table is an accounting aid: The middle row (corresponding to the "+") should be interpreted as showing that if we were to add 1 to the element s k of the die S n , the resulting die, G n , would have an increase of γ k in the number of pairs (g i , b j ) with g i > b j as compared to die S n versus B n ; and a decrease of γ k+1 in the number of pairs (g i , b j ) with g i < b j as compared to die S n versus B n . Thus the "net gain" of adding one to element s k would be ξ k . The X is just a place holder (since we may not add one to n)
Likewise, the bottom row (corresponding to the "−") should be interpreted as showing that if we were to subtract 1 from the element s k of the die S n , the resulting die, G n , would have an decrease of γ k−1 in the number of pairs (g i , b j ) with g i > b j as compared to die S n versus B n ; and an increase of γ k in the number of pairs (g i , b j ) with g i < b j as compared to die S n versus B n . Thus the "net loss" of subtracting one from element s k would be ξ k−1 . The X is just a placeholder (since we may not subtract one from 1).
Thus, to construct a dieD n that beats B n , we need simply find a pair (ξ i , ξ j ) with i = j + 1 and ξ i > ξ j . Then, simply add 1 to s i and take 1 away from s j and the resulting die will beat B n .
Evidently, if ξ a = ξ b for some a, b, then our algorithm works. Thus, it is sufficient to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2. If n ≥ 4, then ∃ a pair a, b ∈ 1, 2, ..., n , for which ξ a = ξ b .
Before proving this lemma, we present an example of the algorithm. Proof of the lemma is placed after Example 3, in Section 4.1. 
Proof of Lemma 2
Evidently ξ a = ξ b ∀a, b ∈ 1, 2, . . . , n if and only if
which holds if and only if
We also have the following two relationships:
We can combine Equations 35 and 36 to obtain:
and
Now observe, we cannot have both γ 1 ≥ 1 and γ 2 ≥ 1 since if one were equal to 1 and the other were greater than 1, this would violate 36; and if they were both equal to 1, then B n = S n , a contradiction. Thus, either γ 1 or γ 2 must be equal to 0.
Suppose n is odd and that γ 1 = 0. Then from equation 37 we have
which does not have a solution in integers n, γ 2 for n > 3. Now suppose that n is odd and that γ 2 = 0. Then from equation 37 we have
which does not have a solution in integers n, γ 1 for n > 1. Thus, we conclude that n cannot be odd.
Suppose n is even and that γ 1 = 0. From equation 38 we must have γ 2 = 2 and n + 2 = n + 1
which is obviously a contradiction. Finally, suppose n is even and that γ 2 = 0. From equation 38 we must have γ 1 = 2 and n = n + 1
which is also a contradiction. Thus we have proved Lemma 2.
Propositions 3 and 1 immediately follow. We may also write the following Corollary, which we have proved "along the way". Corollary 1. Let n ≥ 4. Then, for any die B n = S n , ∃ a dieD n that is the image of a one-step Φ on the standard die S n , i.e. Φ(S n ) =D n , that beats B n .
Note that given some die B n = S n , our algorithm yields every winning die (i.e. a die that beats B n ) that is a one-step away from S n . Moreover, it is easy to see how using our algorithm, we could also obtain the set of losing dice that are a one-step away from S n . Because our algorithm also allows us to find the net effect of any one-step applied to S n , for any B n = S n , we are also able to find the "best" (and "worst") die/dice a one-step away from S n to play versus B n . The die or dice with the greatest net gain from the one-step would have the highest likelihood of beating S n (and thus the greatest expected utility). In the same manner, the die or dice with the greatest (in absolute
